In this study, we are trying to understand if there is any reason or cause
that justifies the scarce presence of women
on the boards of directors.
In particular, we try to understand
if it is because they have a different capacity
to monitor the behavior of managers.
We have reached three conclusions.
First of all, there are no differences
between men and women in their monitoring capacities.
Second, there is discrimination
in the access to the boards of directors.
There are companies that, systematically,
prefer to hire men instead of women.
Third, that these companies that discriminate against women
in the access to the boards of directors
are, systematically, those that have worse financial information.
The results can probably be applied to the Spanish case.
The main problem and reason why we use a British sample
is that there are so few women
on the Spanish boards of directors
that we couldn't carry out a typical statistical work.
We used a big database
of large British companies
and we tried to identify
those companies that discriminated against women
versus those that do not discriminate women.
We use statistical models that predict how many women
should be on the board of directors
according to the characteristics of the company.
There are two fundamental applications.
The first one would be to consider
why there are so few women on the boards of directors
when there is no difference appreciated.
The second one is an implication:
not having women on the boards of directors
or having very few, it can be a sign
that the company prepares worse financial information.
We show that there is no cause and effect.
Women do not behave different from men
but the companies hire them differently.
There are companies that discriminate against women,
and they are precisely those that manipulate the information.
And there are companies that hire more women and do not discriminate,
and they are precisely those that do not manipulate the information.